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A substantial share of Europe’s population consists of immigrants and the children of 
immigrants. Using European Social Survey data, this study examines whether the 
gender egalitarian values of immigrants are shaped by the gender relations in their 
origin country and whether they adapt their values to the standards of their residence 
country. The analyses show that immigrants originating from countries with very 
inegalitarian gender relations support gender equality less than members of 
mainstream society. However, immigrants adapt their gender ideology to the 
standards of their residence country, and the origin context loses force over time. 
Both, acculturation within the first generation and acculturation across the generations 
play a role; but women tend to ‘assimilate’ within the first generation and more 
thoroughly than men.   
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Introduction 
 
Gender equality is increasingly promoted in public policy across many countries, and 
appears to be supported by public opinion on egalitarian gender roles (Brooks and 
Bolzendahl 2004; Treas and Widmer 2000). Yet there are vast differences across the 
globe, with attitudes in relation to the role of women being considered as one of the 
main dividing lines between Western countries and other world regions (Inglehart and 
Norris 2009). Most immigrants move from countries with less gender egalitarian 
cultures
1
 to countries with greater equality between the sexes. Furthermore, gender 
unequal attitudes can have a negative impact on a variety of outcomes such as 
employment or earnings, and may explain at least some of the disadvantage 
experienced by immigrant women, who face particular obstacles for example in 
relation to labour market integration (Rubin et al. 2007).  
 
Despite these important issues, comparatively little research systematically explores 
the gender role attitudes of migrant men and women in this context. The main 
questions that arise are whether origin country contexts influence gender role attitudes 
after migration, and whether this influence persists or diminishes over time and across 
migrant generations, leading to an adjustment to the prevalent standards of the 
residence country. The previous literature has shown the more socially conservative 
values of immigrants and their children (Dagevos, Gijsberts and Van Praag 2003; 
Ersanilli 2012; Röder and Mühlau, 2012). However, research on these attitudes, and 
specifically migrants’ gender roles, has largely focused on a specific group, or a small 
number of groups of migrants within the same country, such as for example Turks in 
Germany (Diehl, Koenig and Ruckdeschel 2009; Güngör and Bornstein 2009; 
Inglehart and Norris, 2003, 2009;), Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands (De Valk 
2006) or Arabs and Hispanics in the United States (Leaper and Valin 1996; Read 
2003; Su, Richardson and Wang 2010). The groups studied tend to come from less 
gender egalitarian countries, and while they are frequently found to also have less 
egalitarian attitudes than the native population in the relevant host country, there has 
been no study to date that systematically investigates the impact of the country of 
origin on migrants’ gender role attitudes. This is done here by comparing the attitudes 
of migrants from countries that differ relatively little from the host country in terms of 
gender egalitarianism to those from regions where gender inegalitarian beliefs are 
much more prevalent.  
 
A related question is whether acculturation occurs largely within the first generation, 
or mainly between generations. Studies have shown that amongst natives, cohort 
replacement rather than within cohort change contributes to the shift in average 
gender role attitudes in many countries (e.g. Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). On the 
other hand, there is evidence that individuals may experience changes in their 
attitudes later in life if they are exposed to different beliefs (Cunningham 2008). The 
within generation change is systematically compared to the between generation 
change here. Unlike much previous research, this study includes not only first and 
second generation migrants, but also natives as a reference category, and the children 
of one native and one immigrant parent. The latter can be expected to be better 
integrated in the host society (Kalmijn 2010), and may therefore differ quite strongly 
from those with two foreign born parents. 
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Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, this study systematically explores gender 
differences in acculturation patterns.  Male and female experiences after migration 
differ notably, with men frequently experiencing downward mobility, whereas many 
women for the first time enter the labour market, which is accompanied by changes in 
the endowment with social and economic resources and in how they see their position 
in society (Fernández-Kelly and Garcia 1990). There are diverging claims in relation 
to the acculturation of male and female migrants. On the one hand, it has been argued 
that immigrant women and their daughters are more strictly monitored than men and 
boys (Idema and Phalet 2007). On the other hand, adoption of values may not only be 
driven by exposure to these ideas, but also influenced by interests (Bolzendahl and 
Myers 2004). Hence, immigrant women and their daughters would have more reason 
to adopt egalitarian beliefs than men, as they have more to gain, whereas males may 
perceive a loss in status as a result. Indeed, empirical evidence does supports the latter 
argument, in that immigrants women and their daughters are more gender egalitarian 
(e.g. Dasgupta 1998; Idema and Phalet 2007). However, this gender difference is also 
pronounced amongst the native population (e.g. Treas and Widmer 2000), and in itself 
does not necessarily provide sufficient evidence for differential acculturation patterns. 
By investigating gender differences in relation to the influence of the origin country 
as well as intra-and inter-generational change, this study contributes to this discussion 
by systematically exploring the gendered nature of acculturation in this area. 
 
 
Gender-egalitarianism in post-industrial societies 
 
A wealth of research has documented that gender egalitarianism is on the rise in 
modern post-industrial societies, and that the primacy of the breadwinner role is 
increasingly being challenged.The best researched case appear to be the United States, 
where support for gender egalitarian attitudes was growing at least since the 1970s 
(e.g. Bolzendahl and Myers 2004) but may have plateaued or even ‘re-traditionalised’ 
since the mid-90s (e.g. Lück 2007; Cotter, Hermsen and Vanneman. 2011). European 
countries are diverse with regard to their gender culture reflecting for example 
different religious traditions, differences in welfare state regimes or democratic 
traditions (e.g. Guo and Gilbert 2012; Treas and Widmer 2000). Some, such as the 
Nordic countries, exceed US levels of support for gender equality, while others, such 
as Germany and Italy, lag somewhat behind. Also, for European countries, an increase 
over time in support for gender egalitarianism has been shown and there is not (yet) 
any evidence for a reversal of the trend (Lück 2007; Scott, Alwin and Braun 1996; 
Guo and Gilbert 2012). Moreover, there are some signs of a convergence of gender 
ideologies in Europe due to a ‘catch-up’ of European countries with had less 
egalitarian gender cultures (Pampel 2011).  
 
The increasing support for gender-egalitarian values in post-industrial societies has 
been connected to increasing levels of education and female employment.  However, 
changes in the composition of the population, i.e. the share of people with higher 
education, of women being employed or of men partnered with working women, 
appear to play only a minor role in accounting for these changes. For most countries, 
the main mechanism is cohort replacement, the substitution of older, less gender-
egalitarian by younger more gender-egalitarian cohorts (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; 
Pampel 2011; Scott, Alwin and Braun 1996). Many of the migrants to Europe come 
from countries with lower economic and human development where less equal gender 
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relations prevail. This leads to the question whether origin country contexts continue 
to have an influence on migrants after their arrival in Europe, as well as their 
acculturation within and across generations. 
 
 
Gender ideologies of immigrants and origin country context 
 
Does the origin country context have a lasting influence on the gender attitudes of 
immigrants? Studies on gender attitudes have shown that gender attitudes, like many 
other attitudes, are very malleable in youth and adolescence but are relatively stable in 
adulthood (e.g. Alwin, Braun and Scott 1992).  Research on changing gender attitudes 
in the US and European countries has emphasised the importance of cohort 
replacement as mechanism underlying the trend to more egalitarian gender beliefs in 
these countries. This implies that exposure to gender ideologies and experiences in the 
‘impressionable years’ (Alwin and Krosnick 1991) have a lasting effect on the gender 
egalitarian beliefs in adulthood. Most immigrants migrate to their destination country 
as adults. This implies that they have been raised by parents and in families who 
enacted gender roles and exposed their children to gender ideologies which were 
shaped by the prevailing gender relations in their country of origin.  
 
(H1) First generation immigrants have less gender egalitarian values than 
‘natives’. The difference is expected to be larger for immigrants originating 
from countries where women are less empowered 
 
Currently, evidence for this hypothesis is mainly indirect and confined to the US, 
where lower female labour market participation and higher fertility rates of immigrant 
groups from countries with less egalitarian gender roles are prevalent (e.g. Blau et al. 
2008).  Moreover, labour market participation and fertility pattern of immigrant 
groups also differ for the subsequent generation, which has been evaluated as 
evidence for the inter-generational transmission of gender roles (Antecol 2000). 
Direct studies on the gender roles of immigrants and evidence for acculturation are 
mostly based on small samples and restricted to one or very few immigrant 
communities in one residence country.  Overall, however, findings seem to indicate 
that groups from societies with higher levels of gender inequality have more 
inegalitarian gender role attitudes than natives, as for example Turks in Germany 
(Inglehart and Norris 2003; Diehl, Koenig and Ruckdeschel 2009). Moreover, a 
number of studies have described the strategies of immigrant families and 
communities to maintain the established gender relations in the country of residence 
(e.g. Dasgupta 1998).  
 
 
Intergenerational acculturation of gender attitudes 
 
Assimilation refers to the ‘decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural 
and social differences’ (Alba and Nee 2003). A long tradition of studies, starting with 
the experience of early 20
th
 century migrants to the United States, has investigated the 
extent to which this occurs in different dimensions, such as the achievement of social 
status (Hirschmann and Wong 1981; Neidert and Farley 1985), linguistic shifts 
(Stevens 1992), residential segregation (Massey and Mullan 1984), fertility levels 
(Ford 1990) and inter-marriage (Blau, Blum and Schwartz 1982; Gordon 1964; 
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Kalmijn 1991). Acculturation as one dimension of assimilation refers to the adoption 
of cultural patterns of mainstream society, and ‘happens virtually automatically and is 
usually unintentional’ (Gans 2007, p. 153). It was primarily expected that immigrants 
would integrate into the social and economic systems of the host society, and in this 
process, shed their particular cultural practices (Warner and Srole 1945; Gordon 
1964). More recently, however, it has been argued that socio-economic mobility 
operates independently from assimilation and acculturation (Gans 2007). 
 
Most assimilation theorists assume that acculturation of immigrant groups is achieved 
by generational succession (e.g. Alba and Nee 2003).  The underlying assumption is 
that cultural traits are fairly stable for adults; children of immigrants, however, are 
exposed during their impressionable years to the culture of mainstream society via 
peer socialisation, education and media consumption. This is consistent with findings 
of research on change of gender attitudes among the mainstream population, which 
emphasizes the role of cohort replacement as central mechanism driving changing 
gender attitudes (e.g. Bolzendahl and Myers 2004).  
 
Unlike members of mainstream society, immigrant children partake in two different 
cultural spheres. They grow up in immigrant families and communities who consider 
unequal gender roles as part of their ethnic identity and aim to transmit their cultural 
values to their children. In many cases, this includes active strategies to shelter their 
children from the exposure to mainstream society by locating their families in 
ethnically segregated neighbourhoods, selecting educational institutions, limiting the 
contact of their children with peers from mainstreams society and arranging intra-
ethnic marriages (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Some empirical studies suggest that 
these strategies are only partially successful. For example, foreign born Arab women 
usually have less egalitarian values than Arab women born in the US (Read 2003). 
Similarly, second generation Turks in Germany have attitudes that lie between those 
of natives and first generation Turks (Diehl, Koenig and Ruckdeschel 2009).  Based 
on these theoretical arguments and empirical findings we expect that inter-
generational  acculturation has as a consequence that the gap in gender-egalitarianism 
between mainstream society and immigrants is reduced for the second generation, and 
that intergenerational acculturation also reduces the differences among second 
generation immigrant groups, i.e. that the origin country context loses its influence on 
outcomes: 
 
(H2) Second generation migrants (a) have a more egalitarian gender 
ideology than the first generation; (b) the gender relations of the origin 
country exert less influence on the gender attitudes for second generation 
immigrants than for first generation immigrants.  
 
According to the reasoning above, parental strategies and structural conditions 
preventing the social integration of immigrants inhibit the acculturation of the second 
generation. Examples are Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. 
While gender relations are similarly unequal in both origin countries, De Valk (2006) 
claims that second generation Moroccans have a far more gender egalitarian 
orientation than second generation Turks, and relates this to differentials in the degree 
of social integration of the groups. Inter-marriage is commonly seen as strongest 
cross-cutting tie (Gordon 1964) and Kalmijn (2010) shows for the Netherlands that 
children of mixed families are more socially integrated than children with both 
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parents from an immigrant community. The central causal mechanism for this is the 
number of contacts the children have with members of mainstream society. For Poles 
and Turks in Sweden, Goldscheider, Goldscheider and Bernhardt (2011) show that 
children from mixed parentage develop more gender-egalitarian practices than 
children from intra-ethnic marriages. Using mixed parentage versus intra-ethnic 
parentage as an indicator for social integration, we examine whether children from 
families with one immigrant parent and one parent from mainstream society 
systematically differ with regard to their gender-role attitudes and the importance of 
the origin country of the immigrant parent: 
 
(H3) Children with one parent from mainstream society (a) have a more 
egalitarian gender ideology than children with two immigrants as parents; 
(b) the gender relations of the origin country of the immigrant parent(s) exert 
less influence on the gender attitudes for second generation immigrants from 
mixed families than from families with two immigrants as parents. 
 
 
Intra-generational acculturation 
 
In spite of the alleged importance of childhood and adolescence as ‘impressionable 
years’ for the formation of gender role beliefs, many studies have documented that 
such attitudes can change in later stages if circumstances changes, for example an 
increased  exposure to gender egalitarian beliefs triggers changes in value orientation 
(e.g. Cunningham 2008). Migration requires for many people to establish themselves 
in a context where attitudes and gender relations of the mainstream society are 
substantially different from what they are used to in their origin country. Families 
experience this as challenge to their gender ideology and studies point to intra-familial 
processes of re-negotiating the established gender roles (Dion and Dion 2001). 
 
Empirical studies indicate that the exposure to the prevalent values and discourses in 
the host society values may induce some acculturation among the first generation. For 
example, Latino immigrants gender egalitarianism appears to be correlated with 
length of stay in the United States (Leaper and Valin 1996). The attitudes of Muslims 
in Europe seem to be placed roughly half way between host country and origin 
country attitudes (Inglehart and Norris 2009). Longer residence, and thus greater 
exposure to host country norms and discourses, is therefore expected to be linked to 
greater acceptance of gender egalitarian beliefs, and a weaker influence of the origin 
country context. 
 
(H4) The longer immigrants have stayed in the country of origin the more 
egalitarian their gender ideology and the less important the origin context is 
for their gender ideology 
 
 
Gender differences in acculturation patterns 
 
Do acculturation patterns differ between male and female immigrants and their sons 
and daughters?  Women tend to be seen as responsible for maintaining the culture of 
the immigrant group, placing additional moral expectations on them (Billson, 1995), 
and families appear to be more carefully sheltering daughters from exposure to the 
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dominant culture of mainstream society. It has been documented that girls are more 
strictly monitored than boys (e.g. Idema and Phalet 2007) which from an exposure 
point of view suggests that female immigrants, at least the second generation, should 
hold less gender-egalitarian attitudes than male immigrants.  
 
Previous research, however, points in the opposite direction. For example, Dasgupta 
(1998) finds that the daughters of Indian immigrants hold significantly less 
inegalitarian gender role attitudes than sons and parents. Güngör and Bornstein (2009) 
report that girls in Turkish migrant families have less conservative gender role 
attitudes than boys and adapt more to the host society’s beliefs. Adoption of gender-
egalitarian values appears to be not only driven by ‘passive’ exposure to these values. 
Interest-based explanations are considered to be the major alternative to exposure-
based explanations of gender-egalitarian beliefs (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). 
Individuals are likely to adopt or reject gender-egalitarian attitudes (and seek or avoid 
exposure to those ideas) if these values are congruent with the individual’s interests. 
For female immigrants, the gender egalitarian values of mainstream societies entail a 
liberating promise. Girls who grew up in the host society may no longer be willing to 
accept norms that place them at a disadvantage when they are aware of and 
surrounded by alternative beliefs. Additionally, stricter expectations toward daughters 
of immigrants can lead to increased resistance by girls and a rejection of gender-
inegalitarian beliefs (Dasgupta 1998; Arends-Tóth and Van der Vijver 2009). For the 
first generation, a similar pattern may occur in that women embrace egalitarianism 
more rapidly than men, although there is currently less empirical evidence for this. A 
central mechanism appears to be a challenge to the familial power structure by 
increased control about economic and social resources by women and a parallel 
decline of men’s extra-familial status (e.g., Pessar 1984; Kibria 1990; Lim 1997). 
Men in contrast may continue to insist on these norms and perceive their social 
position as threatened by the changing role of women (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003). 
Considering that female immigrants and their daughters have a strong interest to adopt 
of gender-egalitarian beliefs while male immigrants and their sons have a strong 
interest in preserving unequal gender relations, the last hypothesis is: 
 
(H5) Immigrant women acculturate more strongly than men within and 
across generations: immigrant women (a) adapt quicker to the gender 
culture of the residence country and (b) first and second generation women 
are less strongly influenced by the origin context than men. 
 
 
Data 
 
Data were extracted from Rounds 2 and 4 of the European Social Survey (ESS) 
collected in 2004 and 2008. These are two rounds for which measures of gender 
egalitarianism are included. The ESS is particularly useful for a cross-national study 
because it not only covers a wide range of European countries, but also because it is 
designed to allow cross-national analyses by ensuring that the questions are 
understood in the same way by respondents in different countries and languages. It is 
a high quality data set where the sampling design approximates a simple random 
sample and has a relatively high response rate 
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We use data from 27 out of 33 countries covered by the second and fourth round of 
the ESS. These include the EU 15 countries and the EFTA states Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland. Further, nine new member states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia)
2
 are included. We exclude 
Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, Cyprus, Croatia and Israel from the analysis. 
 
Immigrant groups: In the dataset for this analysis we include natives, defined as 
individuals whose parents and who themselves were born in a country, first 
generation immigrants, defined as respondents whose parents and who themselves 
were born abroad, second generation immigrants, who were born in their country of 
residence, but whose parents were both born abroad, and second generation 
immigrants being born in the country of residence with one parents born in the 
residence country and another being born abroad. We exclude any cases that do not 
belong into any of the four categories, such as return migrants or second generation 
immigrants whose parents are born in different countries. These criteria were used to 
construct the four categories as clearly as possible and exclude any ambiguous cases. 
Individuals are seen as nested within their country of residence and their 
‘community’. First and the two ‘second generations’ immigrants are in separate 
communities even if the origin is identical. 
 
Dependent variables:  As dependent variables two items contained in the ESS are 
used to measure gender egalitarian attitudes. These items are ‘When jobs are scarce, 
men should have more right to a job than women’ and ‘A woman should be prepared 
to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family’. They were measured on a 
five point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree and have been reversed for 
the analysis so that positive values reflect more gender egalitarian beliefs. Both items 
are related to one domain of gender egalitarianism, the primacy of the breadwinner 
role (Davis and Greenstein, 2009).  However, the former is more strongly linked to 
equal rights (Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004) while the latter expresses the idea that 
women should sacrifice their career when caring roles become salient. The 
considerably lower disagreement with the second item by natives (and immigrants) 
(see Appendix 1) and the small differences between native women and men (see 
results) likely reflect that different variations of the male breadwinner/female carer 
model (Lewis, 1992) are still firmly institutionalized in European societies.  
 
Independent variables: The most important independent variables in the model are 
immigrant status, gender, gender relations in the residence country and how much 
they differ between the residence and the origin country, as well as the length of stay 
of first generation immigrants in the country of residence (see Appendix 1 for 
descriptive results). 
 
Immigrant status was assessed according to the country of birth of the respondent and 
parents’ country of birth, and includes natives (reference category), first generation, 
second generation with two foreign born parents and second generation with one 
foreign born parent (see above).   
 
Gender is measured by a dummy variable ‘female’ which takes the value 0 for men 
and the value 1 for women. 
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Gender relations at the country of residence are measured by the Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM). The GEM measures the degree to which men and 
women equally actively participate in economic and political life and is understood as 
a macro-level proxy for egalitarian gender relations. This is covered by three 
dimensions: Female representation in national parliaments as an indicator of political 
representation, female representation in managerial, professional and semi-
professional positions in the economy and the gap in earned incomes between men 
and women (UNPD 2009). Compared with alternative measures such as the Gender 
Development Index (GDI) or the Gender Inequality Index the measure has a lower 
coverage and may be biased to ‘elite-participation’, but it has the advantage that it is 
less confounded with general human development problems (see Klasen 2006) and 
has a higher prima facie validity than alternative measures. 
 
The GEM has a range between 0 and 1. We chose 2005 as the reference year. For 80 
countries, values for the reference year were available. For further 12 countries the 
values of adjacent years (ranging from 2000 to 2007) were used. For countries for 
which these were not available, values were substituted by the average of region X 
religion cells. The substitution was based on 13 regions reflecting geographical 
proximity and similarities in development and political and cultural heritage and on 
whether the country is predominately Muslim or not.  
 
Distances between origin and residence country (GEM Host-Origin) were measured 
as the difference between the GEM of the origin country and the GEM of the 
residence country
3
. The results are also robust with regard to gender equality measure 
chosen
4
.  
 
Length of stay was measured linearly in years. In the ESS, length of stay is coded into 
five categories (less than one year, one to 5 years or less, 6 to 10 years and 11 to 20 
years and more than 25 years). These have been substituted by the mean value of the 
bracket range (.5, 3, 8, 15.5 years) and 37.5 years for the top bracket, and divided by 
10 for ease of presentation.  Checks indicated that the assumption of linearity is 
appropriate for the outcome variables.  
 
Control variables. We controlled the regression for several important variables. Both, 
age and education have been shown to exert a major influence on the gender ideology 
(e.g. Cunningham 2008). The coefficients for age capture both life-cycle and the 
probably more important cohort effects. Age is divided by ten for ease of 
presentation.  A further control variable is religious denomination, which is divided 
into Christian, Muslim and other denominations (reference category: no religion), as 
religious individuals, and Muslims in particular, tend to hold less egalitarian attitudes 
(e.g. Diehl, Koenig and Ruckdeschel 2009). Additionally we control for family status 
in terms of whether a respondent has children in the household, has a partner, and if 
so, whether he or she is married to the partner (reference category: single without 
children) and whether or not a respondent and their partner are employed, which are 
important predictors of attitudes (e.g. Alwin, Braun and Scott 1992). As these 
variables can have different effects for men and women, separate coefficients are 
estimated in all models. We decided not to control for other proxies for the degree of 
acculturation such as language spoken at home or citizenship as both are strongly 
correlated with the length of stay and the immigrant generation, and are at least 
partially a function of time spent in the residence country.  
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Modelling 
 
The data have been modelled as hierarchical linear models (multi-level models) using 
MLwiN 2.27
5
. The specification of the models is motivated by the nesting of the data 
and the structure of the hypotheses we aim to test in order to evaluate whether the data 
support the core ideas of our theoretical sketch. The hypotheses require a direct 
comparison of how variables measured at the level of the surveyed countries affect 
migrants relative to natives. Further, it is expected that these effects differ for first and 
second generation migrants and sub-groups thereof. Moreover, earlier research has 
shown that attitudinal and positional outcomes of migrants do not only depend on the 
circumstances of the residence and origin countries, but also on how they work 
together (e.g. Van Tubergen, Maas and Flap 2004). This is among others reflected in 
the fact that the most important independent variable is measured as distances 
(differences) between survey countries and countries of origin. Accordingly, data of 
natives and of first- and second-generation migrants have been analysed in one model 
with three levels: Individuals at the lowest (n=82,036 of which 5,208 are first 
generation migrants. 1,430 are second generation migrants with both parents being 
immigrants and 3,810 children of mixed parentage) and countries of residence as the 
highest level (n=27). In between are units at the second level, the ‘communities’. 
Communities are defined as (Country of residence X country of origin X immigrant 
status)-cells. An implication of this modelling strategy is that natives form a separate 
cluster of ‘communities’ (for more information on communities see Appendix 2).  
 
As there are no second-level units containing both natives and immigrants, the 
differences between natives and immigrants are measured at the second-level of 
communities and not at the level of individuals. We have consequently chosen to 
separate first and the two types of ‘second generation’ immigrants from the same 
country of origin in the same country of residence in different units, because this 
simplifies the model substantially
6
. In total, there are 1,592 level 2 units. 27 units 
comprise natives, 775 units comprise first generation immigrant communities, 243 
comprise second generation immigrants with both parents from the immigrants 
community and 547 units comprise second generation immigrant communities with 
one parent being immigrant. In total, there are immigrants from 161 different 
countries of origin
7
. 
 
 
Results 
 
For both variables measuring gender ideology two models are presented, with 
coefficients for men and women reported in separate columns. Positive coefficients 
indicate more gender egalitarian attitudes and vice versa. The first models (1.1 and 
2.1) report the gaps between men and women and between ‘natives’ and immigrant 
groups adjusted for control variables. The estimates for the control variables are in 
line with previous studies. The better educated and the younger the respondents are 
(or the later they were born considering the importance of cohort effects outlined 
above) the more egalitarian their gender ideology.  Women have more gender 
egalitarian values, although the gender gap is rather small for the item that mothers 
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should cut back work for children. Gender and educational differences are more 
pronounced for the item that men should have priority for jobs. Being married and 
having children affects women’s attitudes in particular, with more traditional attitudes 
amongst married women and those with children. If a woman is employed, or a man 
has a female partner who works, this has a positive effect on egalitarianism. 
Belonging to a religious denomination, and particular being Muslim, has a strong 
effect on more gender traditional attitudes. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
TABLES 1.1 and 1.2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The second models (1.2 and 2.2) add, at the survey country level, the Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM) as predictor, interacted with each generational group, 
and at the immigrant group level, the difference between the host and the origin 
country GEM, for each generation separately. The larger the value for this 
differential, the larger the gap, i.e. the origin country is less gender egalitarian than the 
host country. For first generation immigrants, the model also contains the variable 
length of stay in the residence country. The estimates for the GEM show a strong 
influence of the residence country context on gender ideology. When interacting the 
residence country GEM with immigrant status, the coefficients show that the host 
context exerts a similar influence on the gender attitudes of immigrants and natives. 
However, a significantly weaker relationship between host country context and 
gender egalitarianism is estimated for male second generation immigrants with both 
parents from an immigrant community. 
 
Does origin country socialisation matter? According to the socialisation hypothesis 
(H1), immigrants, and particularly those from countries with low levels of gender 
empowerment, are expected to have less gender egalitarian attitudes. The estimates 
for immigrant status in the first models reveal that first generation immigrants are 
indeed significantly less gender egalitarian than ‘natives’. This effect would be 
substantially larger if not controlling for religious denomination (-.24 and -.17 for 
‘men should have priority’ and -.25 and -.20 for ‘women should cut down on work for 
sake of family’), as immigrants are on average more likely to belong to a religion than 
natives. These effect sizes could be compared to having one level more of education 
or being a generation older. The estimates for the effect of the gap in gender 
empowerment between residence and origin country are included in the second model 
for all three groups of migrants to give an indication whether the gender ideology of 
migrants is affected by the origin context. For first generation migrants, the estimates 
are strongly significant for both outcome variables and both sexes. Immigrants from 
countries with similar gender empowerment than the residence country have the same 
gender attitudes as ‘natives’. Immigrants from countries where women are 
considerably less empowered than in the residence country, on the other hand, have 
attitudes that are substantially less gender-egalitarian. Taken together, the data are 
fully supportive for the first hypothesis (socialisation hypothesis) in that gender 
ideologies of first generations immigrants are shaped by the origin country context.  
 
Does acculturation happen across generations? The intergenerational acculturation 
hypothesis (H2) suggests that (a) the second generation is more gender egalitarian 
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than the first, and that (b) the origin country exerts less influence on this group than 
on the first generation. The gender ideology of second generation immigrants with 
both parents from the same immigrant group lies between the attitudes of ‘natives’ 
and first generation migrants, and is largely not significantly different from natives. 
Second generation immigrants with only one parent from an immigrant community 
have, if anything, a more gender egalitarian attitude than ‘natives’. Compared to the 
first generation, attitudes of the second generation are less traditional, although this 
difference is not significant for women with two foreign born parents. 
 
The intergenerational acculturation hypothesis also leads us to expect that the gap 
between the residence country and the country of the parents’ origin has a weaker 
effect for second generation immigrants than for first generation immigrants. The 
result show that the coefficients of the empowerment gap are significantly smaller for 
both groups of second generation immigrants than for the first generation, and that the 
coefficients for these groups are very small and not significantly different from zero. 
The origin context of their parents does not exert a substantial influence on the gender 
attitudes of second generation migrants even if they are born to ‘ethnic’ families. The 
data are thus supportive of the hypothesis that gender ideology is affected by an 
intergenerational acculturation process. 
 
Does integration matter? The integration hypothesis (H3) holds that (a) children of 
two immigrant parents have less egalitarian gender values than people who originate 
from ‘mixed’ families with one parent from mainstream society and one immigrant 
parent, and that (b) the influence of the gender relations in the origin countries of the 
immigrant parents is less important for second generation immigrants from ’mixed’ 
families than for those from families with two immigrant parents. In line with this 
hypothesis, we find that children from mixed families have a more egalitarian 
orientation than children from ‘ethnic’ families. The differences between the 
coefficients for people born in the residence country to two immigrant parents and for 
people born to one immigrant and one native parent are significantly different with 
the exception of men on the variable ‘women should cut down on work for sake of 
family’(see Models 1.1. and 2.1). It is not the case that the origin country context 
matters less for people from mixed families, but this is largely because the gender 
relations of their parents’ origin country matter so little for people from ‘ethnic’ 
families.   
 
Do first generation migrant acculturate their gender attitudes? The intra-generational 
acculturation hypothesis (H4) suggests that longer residence is associated with more 
gender egalitarian attitudes, and with a weaker effect of the origin country. Positive 
slopes for length of stay - with the exception of male migrants for ‘women should cut 
down on work’ - show that first generation immigrants have a more egalitarian gender 
ideology the longer they are in the country of residence (Models 1.2 and 2.2). 
However, the coefficients are larger for the item ‘men should have more right to job’ 
than for ‘women should cut down on work’. The coefficients are significantly 
different from zero for both items as far as women are concerned. For men, only the 
coefficient on ‘men should have more right to job’ is in the expected direction and 
significant. If the product term between length of stay and the empowerment gap 
between residence and origin country is added, the coefficients are positive as 
expected, but only significant for women. In general, the findings are consistent with 
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the intra-generational acculturation hypothesis (H4), but the relationship is stronger 
for the item ‘men should have more right to job’ and for women compared to men. 
 
Is there a gender difference in acculturation? The final hypothesis (H5) is that 
acculturation patterns differ between female and male immigrants, expecting that (a) 
women acculturate quicker to the gender ideology prevailing in the residence country, 
and (b) that they are less strongly influenced by the origin country. In line with this 
expectation, we find that the empowerment gap between the residence and origin 
country affects the gender ideology of first generation women to a lesser degree than 
the attitudes of men (this difference is significant only for ‘men have priority for 
jobs’), and that length of stay slopes are steeper for women than for men, although the 
difference in the latter effects remains below conventional significance levels. The 
interpretation that this indicates that women are more eager to adapt to the host 
country context is further substantiated by the significant coefficient for the product 
term between the empowerment gap and length of stay for women only. The influence 
of the origin country context is about the same for men and women who recently 
migrated to the residence country, but it is considerably and significantly weaker for 
women who migrated a long time ago. 
  
Figure 1 compares the gender egalitarian values of immigrant women and men to 
native men and women as the reference group. The figure is based on simulations in 
which we calculated the predicted scores based on the model with the interaction 
between length and host-origin country differential (full model not presented here). 
For the immigrant groups, values have been calculated for different constellations of 
origin and residence countries. For this purpose we have ranked the differences 
between residence and origin country, and calculated the outcome for the upper limits 
of the first quartile (’small difference’), the median (’medium difference’), the third 
quartile (’large difference’) and the ninth decile (’very large difference’) of distances 
between origin and residence country.  
 
 
------------------------------- 
FIGURE 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
 
The values for established immigrants have been calculated for migrants who have 
been in the country of residence for 35 years. The gap between the lines for the 
immigrants with 5 years of stay and for the immigrants with 35 years of stay can be 
seen to represent the extent of intra-generational assimilation. The graphs illustrate the 
striking difference in the acculturation patterns between men and women as well as 
differences between the two items.  Established female migrants respond to the rights-
based priority item in the same way as native women; for these women the gender 
relations of their origin do not matter anymore. In contrast to the fully assimilated 
women, the attitudes of established male migrants are still shaped to some degree by 
their origin context. However, their attitudes are much more similar to the attitudes of 
natives than to the attitudes of recently arrived males. When compared with ‘men 
having priority’, the acculturation process is much slower for the ‘women should cut 
back’- item. Established women, in particular when they come from countries with 
very unequal gender relations, continue to hold more traditional than native women, 
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but intra-generational change accounts for most of the difference between native 
women and recent arrivals. For men, there is a substantial gap between established 
migrants and natives and hardly any difference between recent and established 
migrants. Turning to the second generation, sons and daughters of mixed parentage 
(not included in Figure 1) are largely undistinguishable from native born men and 
women without a migration background. Similarly, the origin context does not appear 
to play a role for second generation immigrants with two foreign born parents.  
 
What is more important, intra-generational or inter-generational acculturation? We 
firstly calculate the difference between a first generation migrant who has been in the 
country for five versus 35 years. We then calculate the difference between a migrant 
who has been in the country for 20 years and a second generation migrant whose 
parents were both born abroad as a measure for the extent of inter-generational 
acculturation. Comparing these values (Table 2) gives an indication of the relative 
importance of intra- versus inter-generational change. The general pattern is that intra-
generational acculturation plays a more important role than inter-generational 
acculturation for women, especially on the item ‘men having priority’. For men, the 
opposite is the case, and the main change appears to occur between rather than within 
generations.  
 
 
------------------------------- 
TABLE 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
European countries experience inward migration from countries with less gender 
egalitarian cultures. In this study, we show that the country of origin matters for the 
gender-role beliefs of immigrants. Immigrants from countries with inegalitarian 
gender cultures hold far less gender egalitarian attitudes than natives or immigrants 
from countries with similar gender cultures than the host countries. However, this 
study also shows that these differences do not persist. In line with assimilation theory, 
gender attitudes of immigrants appear to become more similar to the gender attitudes 
of natives over time. This acculturation process is almost completed within one 
generational succession: The gender attitudes of second generation immigrants are 
difficult to distinguish from the attitudes of members of mainstream society. This 
holds also for children born to immigrants from very gender-inegalitarian cultures and 
for children born to less well integrated immigrant families.  
 
Although both inter- and intra-generational acculturation play a role in the process, 
there are clear indications that the first immigrant generation already tends to adopt 
the gender egalitarian norms of mainstream society: Longer residing migrants are 
more likely to subscribe to gender egalitarian views than recent arrivals, and the 
influence of origin country factors diminishes. The relative importance of the first 
generation’s acculturation differs between women and men and between the nature of 
the items examined (see below). The broad picture, however, is that much of the 
differences separating recent immigrants and natives are not any longer visible when 
established immigrants and natives are compared.  
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Assimilation becomes even more apparent in the second generation, especially when 
considering also those with only one foreign born parent. This group is frequently 
overlooked in research on the second generation, although they represent a 
numerically stronger group than the offspring of two immigrant parents. It is well 
established that inter-marriage is one of the strongest markers of integration (Kalmijn 
2010), and much similarity is observed here amongst the offspring of such couples 
and natives.  Interestingly, this group is even more gender egalitarian than the 
children of two native parents, which shows that they are not merely ‘in between’ 
second generation migrants with two foreign-born parents and natives. Indeed it is 
quite possible that those engaged in inter-ethnic relationships already had a more 
gender egalitarian orientation to begin with, and that this contributes to the more 
egalitarian attitudes observed amongst their offspring. Additionally, the formation of 
inter-ethnic relations may facilitate a reflexive disengagement with established gender 
beliefs and practices of both the immigrant and native community. 
 
While differences between second generation immigrants with two immigrant parents 
and with only one foreign born parents emphasize the importance of social integration 
for acculturation outcomes, it is noteworthy that even those whose parents were both 
born abroad are more similar to the mainstream than the first generation. The data 
show little evidence that immigrants from very gender-inegalitarian societies 
successfully shelter themselves and their offspring from the influences of the host 
culture and reproduce the gender ideologies of their origin countries. Most studies 
describing or assuming parental strategies to control exposure to their children to 
egalitarian gender values are about immigrant populations with a substantial gap in 
gender equality between residence and origin country, such as Mexicans in the US or 
Turks in Germany. Comparisons between the descendents of European and Mexican 
immigrants in the US (Su, Richardson and Wang 2010), or between children of 
Surinamese and Antillean immigrants and children of Turkish and Moroccan 
immigrants in the Netherlands (Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver 2009) emphasize the 
inter-generational transmission of gender attitudes with little evidence for 
convergence of the gender attitudes of second generation immigrants. The findings of 
this study cast doubts whether these are more general patterns. If effective sheltering 
strategies are primarily used in immigrant communities from strongly unequal gender 
cultures, the origin context should continue to differentiate between the attitudes of 
second generation immigrants. According to our analyses, the gender relations of the 
origin countries ceased to exert a systematic influence on the attitudes of second 
generation immigrants. This implies that the gap between the attitudes of first 
generation and second generation immigrants is more strongly reduced for immigrants 
originating from societies with more unequal gender roles. Future research may be 
able to analyse further to what extent other factors impede acculturation, in particular 
religion considering the overall less egalitarian attitudes of Muslims in Europe seen in 
the data here, and their frequently claimed lack of assimilation (Sniderman and 
Hagendoorn 2007). 
 
The study also highlights differences between men and women, with women adapting 
more straightforwardly than men. The outcomes amongst men vary to a greater 
extent, and this is particularly pronounced for established first generation immigrants. 
While they are still strongly influenced by the origin country context and have 
substantially different attitudes then native men, established female immigrants have 
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largely embraced the comparatively more egalitarian gender attitudes of native 
women of the residence countries. This difference in acculturation between male and 
female migrants reflects what has been suggested based on some qualitative and 
smaller scale quantitative studies of individual migrant groups (e.g. Dasgupta 1998 
for Asian Indian migrants in the US; Güngör and Bornstein 2009 for Turks in 
Germany), but extends this by showing this pattern more systematically, 
demonstrating the value of incorporating gender as one of the factors that can 
‘segment’ assimilation trajectories (Curran et al. 2006). Theoretically, these 
differences point to interest- and power-based explanations as women have a 
particular self-interest in embracing more egalitarian ideas and are frequently 
empowered by shifts in the control of resources. The status and identity of immigrant 
men in contrast is supported by inegalitarian gender ideologies, and men may 
consequently be more reluctant to adopt gender-egalitarian values. This links to 
previous research that indicates that male migrants frequently react to the status threat 
of increasing female empowerment by symbolic and coercive means to preserve their 
dominance in the family (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Pessar 1984).  
 
These gendered acculturation patterns may have important consequences in other 
areas, such as marital conflict and family formation amongst immigrant groups. 
Firstly, differences in gender attitudes between partners are linked to greater 
likelihood of conflict and even violence in partnerships (Bhanot and Senn 2007). It 
has been suggested that this may be occurring in immigrant families if women adopt 
gender egalitarian ideas and behaviours more so than their male partner (Min 2001). 
A second consequence can be the choice of partner within the first but also the second 
generation. It is not unusual for migrants, in particular males, to marry a partner from 
their country of origin, rather than a native or another member of the same migrant 
group already in the host country (e.g. Lievens 1999), and such couples tend to have a 
more traditional division of labour (see for example Huschek, De Valk and Liefbroer 
2011 for Turks in the Netherlands). 
 
The study revealed also that immigrants adopt host-country standards more quickly 
and more thoroughly for the item that asked whether men should have priority over 
women when jobs are scarce than for the item that asked whether women should cut 
back work for the sake of the family (see Table 2). The first item is more strongly 
related to the public domain of equal rights between the genders and expresses 
‘rights-based beliefs’ (Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004). In contrast, the second item 
refers more to ‘private’ family arrangements and is more akin to ‘gender essentialism’ 
of the post-feminist discourse with an emphasis on enacting an ‘intensive 
motherhood’ role (Cotter, Hermsen and Vanneman 2011). This also reflects the 
limited gender equality achieved in European societies with the continuing dominance 
of variations of the male breadwinner model (see Lewis 1992; Guo and Gilbert, 
2012). The acculturation differential between these items may point to a lower 
legitimacy of inegalitarian attitudes interfering with individual rights and a more 
fragmented discourse with regard to gender-role enactment, or a stronger importance 
of values pertaining to ‘private’ family arrangements for the identity of immigrants.  
This links to previous research of immigrants in the Netherlands, where cultural 
values based on family and marital values were more stable than gender role values 
(Arends-Tóth and Van der Vijver 2009). The acculturation differential may also 
indicate that immigrants experience stronger tensions between egalitarian values and 
gendered practices across the life-cycle than native couples (Bühlmann, Elcheroth and 
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Tettamanti 2010). It would be of interest to determine which aspects of gender 
egalitarian beliefs immigrants are more likely to adopt than others. Here, only two 
dependent variables for gender attitudes could be analysed. Other surveys, including 
large international studies, frequently use more refined measurements; however, none 
of these currently allow a study of origin effects due to the absence of country of 
origin data. 
 
Another limitation is that within generation changes were measured by length of stay 
in this study. Without panel data it is not possible to exclude the possibility that we 
are observing migrant cohort effects rather than actual change over time. Yet it is not 
very plausible that the entire length of stay effect that is observed in this study as well 
as in other studies would be explained by such selection effects, as this would require 
earlier cohorts from the same country to have been significantly more gender 
egalitarian in their orientations than more recent cohorts.  
 
Also, the data used here was not a specific immigrant survey. This had the advantage 
of allowing the inclusion of natives and respondents with one immigrant parent who 
do not normally feature in surveys of the immigrant population. However, certain 
groups of migrants may be underrepresented, despite efforts of the ESS to achieve a 
representative sample. Less well integrated migrants may be less likely to participate 
in the study, and these are also groups that are more likely to hold and maintain 
gender-inegalitarian beliefs. The extent of acculturation may therefore be slightly 
overestimated here, whereas the general pattern and country level effects are unlikely 
to be affected. 
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Endnotes 
 
 
1 By ‘gender cultures’ we refer to institutionalised gender relations in a society. 
‘Gender relations’ refer to the totality of mechanisms that structure the (inter)action 
and access to socially valued resources of women and men. Normative expectations 
regarding the behaviour of women and men (gender roles) are integral part of gender 
relations and find their reflection in individual or institutionalised attitudes (or 
synonymous ‘beliefs’ or ‘ideologies’). We assume that gender relations, gender roles 
and gender beliefs can be ordered on a continuum between unequal or inegalitarian 
and equal or egalitarian relations, roles or beliefs. Gender inequality manifest itself 
among others in unequal access to powerful and socially rewarded social positions 
and includes gender-bias in the allocation of rewards to positions (England, 2010). 
While gender roles may be primarily perceived as role differentiation (and not as role 
hierarchy) and gender beliefs may be primarily articulated as gender difference (rather 
than unequal worth), a specific orientation and responsibility of women toward family 
carer roles and a corresponding emphasis on men as family providers is a central 
mechanism to reproduce unequal access to power, resources and rewards in societies 
with a strong differentiation between private (family) and public sphere and hence an 
indicator for gender inegalitarian roles and beliefs.  
 
2
 Models are robust to the exclusion of particular countries, as well as the exclusion of 
all New Member States. 
 
3 
Since the distances reflect the differences between origin and residence countries in 
2005 rather than the migration years of the individual immigrants, it is noteworthy we 
examined how stable the relative values are over time. For the 72 countries, for which 
values for the first (1995) and the last year (2009) are available, the correlation is .84.  
 
4
 Using the Gender-Development Index or country-average gender-ideology derived 
from the World Value Survey leads to similar results (XXXX). 
 
5 
Both ordered logistic and linear models were estimated. As findings did not differ 
substantially, only the linear models are presented here for ease of presentation and 
interpretation. 
 
6
An implication of this way of modelling is that dummies for first and second 
generation immigrants are variables that vary at the community level and not an 
individual level attribute. The regression coefficients for these dummy variables 
represent thus not the average difference between a first-generation or second-
generation migrant and a native individual within a country but between the average 
native and the average first- and second-generation migrant community.  
 
7 
Random intercepts have been specified for the higher levels and random slopes for 
variables that are interacted with higher level predictor variables. 
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Table 1.1: Multi-Level Linear Regression: Disagreement with ‘Men having priority for jobs’ 
 
 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 
 Men Women Men Women 
 Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. 
Fixed Part         
Intercept 3.28*** .08   3.30*** .05   
Gender (Ref.:Male) 
   Female    .37*** .03    .36*** .03 
Generation (Ref: Native) 
   First Generation -.18*** .05 -.13*** .05  .01 .04 -.01 .04 
   Second Gen., both -.05 .06 -.12* .06 -.12* .07 -.12* .07 
   Second Gen., one  .08 .05  .09* .05  .07* .04  .09** .04 
Age         
   Age in years/10 -.10*** .00 -.13***c .00 -.10*** .00 -.13***c .00 
Education (Ref.: Upper Secondary)        
   Primary Education -.40*** .02 - .52***c .02 -.40*** .02 -.51***c .02 
   Lower Secondary -.23*** .02 - .29***b .02 -.23*** .02 -.29***b .01 
   Tertiary   .31*** .02  .26***a .02  .31*** .02  .27***a .01 
Family status (Ref: Single, no children)        
   Single, children  .17*** .05  .07***a .02  .17*** .05  .08*** .02 
   Partner, no children  .09** .03 -.05*c .03  .09*** .03 -.05*c .03 
   Partner, children  .05 .03 -.16***c .03  .05* .03 -.16***c .03 
   Married, no children  .03* .02 -.13***c .02  .03* .02 -.13***c .02 
   Married, children  .02 .02 -.20***c .02  .03 .02 -.20***c .02 
Employment status (Ref.: Not employed)        
   Respondent employed  .02* .01  .19***c .01  .02* .01  .19***c .01 
   Partner employed  .11*** .02 -.01c .02  .11*** .02 -.01c .02 
Religious denomination (Ref.: No religion)        
   Christian -.13*** .01 -.14*** .01 -.13*** .01 -.14*** .01 
   Muslim -.60*** .05 -.45***b .05 -.50*** .05 -.42*** .05 
   Other -.03 .07 -.12* .07  .03 .07 -.10 .07 
Length of Stay         
   Length in years/10     .05** .02  .09*** .02 
Host country 
   GEM Host     3.13*** .36 2.73***b .40 
         X First Generation     -.17 .38 -.51 .38 
         X Second Gen, both     -1.40** .51  .15b .51 
         X Second Gen, one     -.16 .31 -.46 .33 
Host-origin differential         
   GEM Host-Origin  X First Generation  -1.06*** .15 -.65***b .16 
   GEM Host-Origin  X Second Gen, both   .22 .25  .03 .25 
   GEM Host-Origin  X Second Gen, one  -.09 .18 -.12 .18 
Interaction length and host-origin differential 
(Length of Stay (years/10) X  GEM Host-Origin2 
    
 .09 .10  .30***a .10 
 
Random Part
1
         
Country intercept   .12 .04    .04 .01   
Gender-Country Slope  .01 .00    .01 .00   
Immigrant group intercept  .04 .01    .02 .00   
Gender-Group Slope  .01 .00    .01 .00   
Length-Group Slope      .01 .00   
Individual level variance 1.12 .01   1.11 .01   
Controlled for ESS round (not reported) 
Significance levels (a) different from zero: *=p< .10, **=p < .05,***=p < .01, two-tailed; based on non-rounded 
coefficients 
(b) different from coefficient for males: a= p< .10, b=p < .05,c=p < .01 
Case numbers: n1= 82,036, n2=1592, n3=27 
1 Co-variances not reported 
2 Estimates if added to Model 1.2 
 
 
 
          
25 
 
Table 1.2: Multi-Level Linear Regression: Disagreement with ‘Women should be prepared to cut back 
paid work’ 
 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 
 Men Women Men Women 
 Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. 
Fixed Part         
Intercept 2.84*** .07   2.84*** .05   
Gender (Ref.:Male) 
   Female     .14*** .03    .14*** .03 
Generation (Ref: Native) 
   First Generation -.20*** .04 -.17*** .04 -.05 .04 -.07 .04 
   Second Gen., both -.03 .06 -.10 .06 -.08 .07 -.09 .07 
   Second Gen., one  .03 .04  .01 .05  .03 .04  .00 .04 
Age         
   Age in years/10 -.08*** .00 -.10***c .00 -.08*** .00 -.10***c .00 
Education (Ref.: Upper Secondary)        
   Primary Education -.27*** .02 -.28*** .02  -.27*** .02 -.27*** .02 
   Lower Secondary -.14*** .02 -.15*** .01 -.14*** .02 -.15*** .01 
   Tertiary   .20*** .02  .21*** .01  .20*** .02 -.21*** .01 
Family status (Ref: Single, no children)        
   Single, children  .22*** .05 -.02c .02  .22*** .05 -.02c .02 
   Partner, no children  .03 .03 -.03 .03  .03 .03 -.03 .03 
   Partner, children -.04 .03 -.13***b .03 -.04 .03 -.13***b .03 
   Married, no children -.02 .02 -.08***c .01 -.02 .02 -.08***c .01 
   Married, children -.06*** .02 -.22***c .02 -.06*** .02 -.22***c .02 
Employment status (Ref.: Not employed)        
   Respondent employed  .03** .01  .18***c .01  .03** .01 .18***c .01 
   Partner employed  .19*** .01 -.02c .02  .19*** .02 -.02c .02 
Religious denomination (Ref.: No religion)        
   Christian -.19*** .01 -.19*** .01 -.19*** .01 -.19*** .01 
   Muslim -.51*** .05 -.44*** .05 -.42*** .05 -.39*** .05 
   Other -.22*** .07 -.02b .07 -.18*** .07 -.01c .07 
Length of Stay         
   Length in years/10    -.01 .02  .03* .02 
Host country 
   GEM Host     2.43*** .39 2.22*** .41 
         X First Generation     -.12 .35 -.58* .35 
         X Second Gen, both     -1.62*** .53 -.34b .51 
         X Second Gen, one     - .02 .33  .03 .33 
Host-origin differential         
   GEM Host-Origin  X First Generation  -.91*** .15 -.64*** .15 
   GEM Host-Origin  X Second Gen, both   .16 .25 -.07 .25 
   GEM Host-Origin  X Second Gen, one  -.09 .18 -.04 .17 
Interaction length and host-origin differential 
(Length of Stay (years/10) X  GEM Host-Origin2 
    
 .08 .08  .27***a .09 
 
Random Part
1
         
Country intercept   .09 .03    .04 .01   
Gender-Country Slope  .00 .00    .00 .00   
Immigrant group intercept  .03 .01    .01 .00   
Gender-Group Slope  .00 .00    .00 .00   
Length-Group Slope      .00 .00   
Individual level variance 1.08 .01   1.08 .01   
Controlled for ESS round (not reported) 
Significance levels (a) different from zero: *=p< .10, **=p < .05,***=p < .01, two-tailed; based on non-rounded 
coefficients 
(b) different from coefficient for males: a= p< .10, b=p < .05,c=p < .01 
Case numbers: n1= 82,036, n2=1592, n3=27 
1 Co-variances not reported 
2 Estimates if added to Model 2.2 
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Table 2: Extent of intra- and inter-generational acculturation for women and men 
from countries with very large difference in GEM 
 
  Priority Cutting back 
Women Intra-generational .52       .33   
 Inter-generational .23   .26   
Men Intra-generational .22   .04   
 Inter-generational .47    .44   
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Appendix 1: Means and percentages of dependent/independent variables by sub-sample 
 
 Natives 
First-
Generation 
Second 
generation, both 
parents foreign 
born 
Second 
generation, one 
parent 
foreign born 
Gender role attitudes 
   ‘Men having priority’   3.53   3.39   3.38   3.71 
   ‘Women cutting back work’   2.90   2.62   2.76   2.88 
Gender     
   % Female 53.8 54.2 52.4 53.7 
Age     
   Age in years 47.8 46.5 42.2 43.7 
Education     
   % Primary Education 16.8 16.4 15.9   9.4 
   % Lower Secondary 21.0 19.9 21.5 20.4 
   % Upper Secondary 41.8 38.5 44.0 46.0 
   % Tertiary  20.4 25.2 18.6 24.2 
Family status     
   % Single, no children 36.5 32.7 44.8 39.1 
   % Single, children   3.1   3.8   4.3   5.0 
   % Partner, no children   5.0   6.2   6.4   6.9 
   % Partner, children   3.2   3.3   4.3   5.4 
   % Married, no children 32.0 26.7 23.8 24.3 
   % Married, children 20.2 27.4 16.6 19.4 
Employment status     
   % Respondent employed 49.9 52.4 48.0 51.2 
   % Partner employed1 52.1 53.2 49.1 57.3 
Religious denomination     
   % No religion 39.7 34.4 38.7 52.9 
   % Christian 59.3 51.1 47.0 45.6 
   % Muslim     .6 11.3 12.6     .7 
   % Other     .4   3.2   1.7     .7 
Length of Stay     
   Length in years   n/a 23.3   n/a   n/a 
Host country 
   GEM Host     .73      .75     .72     .74 
Host-origin differential 
   GEM Host-Origin   n/a      .17     .18     .08 
N 71588 5208 1430 3810 
Valid cases only; 1Out of those who live with a partner in household 
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Appendix 2: Immigrant sample by country 
 N1 OC2 IC3 GD4 Top-5 EU Origins5 Top-5 Non-EU Origins5 
Austria 307 41 72 .187 DE CZ HU IT  RO TR BA RR HR EG 
Belgium 570 50 85 .296 FR IT NL PL DE MA TR CG RU DZ 
Bulgaria 54 13 22 .052 GR RO CZ GB HU RU MK TR UA BY 
Switzerland 1157 84 140 .086 DE IT FR AT ES TR HR BA RR US 
Czech Republic 339 18 35 .021 SK PL AT DE HU RU UA AL CU MD 
Germany 747 69 113 .248 PL CZ AT IT RO TR RU KZ US RR 
Denmark 251 56 85 .278 DE NO SE PL GB TR LK US MA BA 
Estonia 1057 21 35 .081 LV FI LT DE FR RU UA BY AZ KZ 
Spain 356 55 75 .223 RO PT FR GB IT MA EC AR CO BO 
Finland 79 23 28 .293 SE EE DE FR HU RU US TH CL CN 
France 623 65 102 .147 IT ES PT DE PL DZ MA TN SN CG 
United Kingdom 599 86 143 .218 IE IT PL DE ES IN PK JM NG US 
Greece 498 37 58 .094 BG RO CY GB PL TR AL RU GE EG 
Hungary 140 19 31 -.059 RO SK DE AT PL US RR RU HR UA 
Ireland 124 22 26 .055 GB DE ES NL PL US CA NG AT LK 
Iceland 13 9 10 .180 DE DK FI GB IT IN RU TH   
Italy 22 17 18 .099 FR BG CH CZ DE US AR BA EG BO 
Luxembourg 724 46 70 .206 PT FR DE IT BE CV BA PH RU US 
Latvia 476 15 30 .044 LT PL EE DE GB RU BY UA GE KZ 
Netherlands 458 63 93 .292 DE BE PL GB ES ID SR TR MA IR 
Norway 295 43 62 .294 SE DK GB DE PL US IQ PK BA IR 
Poland 125 16 28 -.014 DE FR LT AT IT RU BY UA US AM 
Portugal 209 25 39 .122 ES FR RO BG  BR CV MZ GW UA 
Romania 27 10 14 -.067 AT GR HU BG  MD RU UA AL HR 
Sweden 625 70 121 .308 FI DE NO DK PL BA IR IQ TR LB 
Slovenia 377 18 30 -.033 AT DE IT FR PL HR BA MK US AU 
Slovak Republic 196 14 27 .043 CZ HU PL RO AT UA RU US AU NG 
1 Number of immigrants in country sample; 2 No. Of origin countries; 3 No. Of immigrant communities;  
4 Average GEM difference between country and immigrant community; 5 ISO country codes 
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Figure1: Attitudes of male and female migrants compared to native men and women by host-origin country differential and length of residence 
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